美国正在进入与中国进行大国竞争的新阶段。但在这样做时，它正在削弱那些使其全球领导地位成为可能的制度。华盛顿不断谈论威慑、军事部署和联盟承诺，然而美国今天面临的最重大的脆弱性不是军事方面的，而是体制方面的。
全球政治中新出现的鸿沟不仅仅存在于民主与威权之间，更越来越多地存在于能够持续、可预测且规模化地交付任务的国家与不能做到的国家之间。以此衡量，美国正在最需要这一战略优势的时候侵蚀它。现代地缘政治竞争在战场之外，更多地在财政部、监管机构、出口管制办公室、工业规划部门和研究机构内部展开。工业政策不是一场演讲，它是一个持续的行政项目。半导体回流、稀土供应安全、清洁能源基础设施和出口管制执行需要政府各部门之间以及与私营部门的长期协调。制裁机制需要财政部、商务部、国务院、情报机构和盟友政府之间的一致行动。
几十年来，美国实力不仅建立在经济规模和军事优势上，还建立在体制公信力上。专业的文官制度提供了跨届政府的连续性。独立的监管机构安抚了市场。大学锚定了创新生态系统。可预测的治理吸引了资本并加强了联盟。今天，这种体制优势显示出压力的迹象。对比指标表明，尽管美国依然强大，但治理系统的碎片化正在导致政策执行效率下降。
The United States is entering a new phase of great-power competition with China. But it is doing so while weakening the very institutions that made its global leadership possible.Washington talks constantly about deterrence, military posture, and alliance commitments. Yet the most consequential vulnerability facing the United States today is not military. It is institutional....The emerging divide in global politics is not simply between democracy and autocracy. It is increasingly between states that can deliver—consistently, predictably, and at scale—and those that cannot. By that measure, the United States is eroding one of its most important strategic advantages at precisely the moment it needs it most.Modern geopolitical competition is being waged less on battlefields than inside finance ministries, regulatory agencies, export-control offices, industrial planning departments, and research institutions. Industrial policy is not a speech; it is a sustained administrative project. Semiconductor reshoring, rare earth supply security, clean-energy infrastructure, and export control enforcement require long-term coordination across government and with the private sector. Sanctions regimes demand alignment between Treasury, Commerce, State, intelligence agencies, and allied governments. Alliance management depends on predictability as much as military strength.When governance systems function coherently, strategy compounds. When they fragment, even strong policies falter.For decades, American power rested not only on economic scale and military superiority but on institutional credibility. A professional civil service provided continuity across administrations. Independent regulatory bodies reassured markets. Universities anchored innovation ecosystems. Courts reinforced rule-of-law expectations. Predictable governance attracted capital and strengthened alliances.Today, that institutional edge shows signs of strain. Comparative indicators suggest that while the United States remains strong in many areas, it no longer consistently outperforms peer democracies in governance effectiveness or institutional trust. On measures of rule of law and constraints on government authority, it ranks behind several advanced democracies. Income inequality exceeds that of most OECD peers. Public confidence in major institutions—including Congress and the media—has declined sharply over the past two decades.Over the past decade, institutional volatility has intensified. During the Trump administration, proposals such as “Schedule F” sought to expand political control over portions of the federal civil service, potentially weakening merit-based protections designed to preserve continuity across administrations. Public pressure on independent institutions, including the Federal Reserve, introduced signals of uncertainty into financial markets. Trade policy shifted abruptly, with tariffs imposed and lifted unpredictably, complicating long-term supply chain planning.Subse
