在当前伊朗冲突的背景下，思考突尼斯似乎显得不合时宜，但过去几十年与伊朗及逊尼派极端组织的斗争经验告诉我们：对手会在任何可能的地方发起挑战，在那些拥有高素质人口且靠近地理咽喉的国家尤其如此。基于此，希特勒曾指示隆美尔将突尼斯作为其非洲战役的支柱；罗斯福也决定在突尼斯让美军首次迎击纳粹；而ISIS在此的大举招募，更使突尼斯人按人均计算成为伊拉克和叙利亚之外“哈里发国”中代表性最强的国籍。
这些仅是历史上各大势力试图将突尼斯作为非洲滩头阵地的近例。古罗马元老迦图那句“迦太基必须毁灭”至今仍回响，因为它已成为一种象征。突尼斯不仅是北非的地理中心，更是连接欧洲与非洲、地中海东西部的关键纽带。对于美方而言，重新审视并加强与突尼斯的战略合作，不仅是为了应对当前的地区冲突，更是为了构建一个能够抵御外部势力渗透的北非安全框架。加强防务合作、提升当地政府的治理能力以及深化经贸往来，应成为未来战略的优先事项。
Editor’s Note: Joey R. Hood is an American diplomat and career member of the Senior Foreign Service who most recently served as U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia (2023–2025). Over a distinguished diplomatic career, he has held senior leadership roles across the Middle East, including Chargé d’affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission in Baghdad, Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait, and Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. In Washington, Hood served as Acting Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, where he oversaw U.S. policy across the region. His earlier assignments include roles focused on Iran, public diplomacy in Qatar, and political-economic affairs in Yemen.A former Fulbright scholar in Burkina Faso and a Pickering Fellow, Hood holds a BA from Dartmouth College and an MA from The Fletcher School at Tufts University. He speaks French and Arabic.By Hafed Al-Ghwell, Senior Fellow and Director, North Africa Program
Introduction
In the context of the Iran war, it may seem like an odd time to be thinking about Tunisia, but our experience with the Iranian regime and Sunni extremist organizations over the past several decades teaches us that our adversaries will contest anywhere they can, and nowhere more so than in countries with highly educated populations near geographic chokepoints. With that in mind, it is no surprise that Hitler instructed Rommel to hold Tunisia as the linchpin of his Africa campaign, that Roosevelt decided Tunisia was where the U.S. Army would first face the Nazis, and that ISIS recruited so heavily there that Tunisians became, on a per capita basis, the most well-represented nationality in the “caliphate” beyond Iraq and Syria.
These are, of course, only two of the most recent examples of empires on the move trying to use Tunisia as an African beachhead. Cato the Elder’s phrase “Carthago delenda est” echoes down through the ages to us because it became symbolic of a powerful entity obsessed with destroying its rival. Over 1,400 years later, St. Louis IX, King of France, died in present-day Tunisia while pursuing his own obsession: driving a definitive wedge between the Abbasid Empire in the east and Andalusia in the west. France returned six centuries later, but not until after the Ottomans had ruled Tunisia for three centuries themselves. During that time, a new, mercantilist country arose 5,600 miles to the west, whose diplomats (two of whom would later serve as president) set their sights on negotiating treaties with Tunis and its neighbors. When those negotiations failed, this new country, the United States of America, embarked on its first foreign war to secure the Strait of Sicily for American shipping.
What is it about this small, keystone-shaped land at Africa’s northernmost point that has obsessed great powers east and west for more than two millennia? One unchanging attribute is its geographic position, occupying one side of th