美以对伊朗的战争揭露了一个许多决策者长期以来宁愿回避的现实:统治海湾地区数十年的威慑模式已不再按预期运作。多年来,该地区一直在“灰色地带”运行——秘密袭击、代理人战争和精心控制的局势升级。伊朗围绕导弹、地区伙伴和核潜能构建了战略。美国在不进行直接战争的情况下为海湾安全提供保障。沙特阿拉伯及其邻国依赖这一保护伞,同时针对其局限性进行对冲,投资于导弹防御和选择性伙伴关系。即便没有成文,规则依然存在。那个世界正在瓦解。上周宣布的美国和伊朗之间为期两周的停火说明了这一点,该停火是在经历了40天的持续轰炸后由巴基斯坦斡旋达成的。出现的并不是持久的协议,而是一个脆弱的暂停,已经受到以色列对黎巴嫩持续袭击、霍尔木兹海峡争议条款(以及现在的美国海军封锁)以及伊朗指责违约的压力。停火与其说是回归秩序,不如说是秩序缺失的缩影:它是临时性的、有条件的,并依赖于一个与华盛顿和德黑兰的安全关系本身就受到限制的调解人。正在出现的不仅仅是更多的冲突升级,而是一种不同类型的冲突:直接的、持续的对抗,且没有明确证据表明压倒性的武力能够带来决定性的政治结果。当前战役的规模清楚地说明了这一点。美以军事行动针对伊朗的核基础设施、导弹网络和指挥系统,其节奏与2003年伊拉克战争的开局阶段相当。截至3月中旬,美以军队已在伊朗31个省中的26个省进行了超过15,000次打击,美国的军事集结被描述为自2003年以来在中东规模最大的一次。早期报告和官方摘要证实了一场针对伊朗领导层、核遗址和导弹的广泛行动。
The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has exposed a reality many policymakers long preferred to avoid: The deterrence model that governed the Gulf for decades is no longer working as intended.For years, the region operated in the gray zone — covert strikes, proxy warfare, and carefully managed escalation. Iran built a strategy around missiles, regional partners, and nuclear latency.The United States underwrote Gulf security without direct war. Saudi Arabia and its neighbors relied on that umbrella while hedging against its limits, investing in missile defense and selective partnerships. There were rules, even if unwritten.That world is breaking down.The two-week ceasefire announced last week between the United States and Iran, brokered by Pakistan after 40 days of sustained bombardment, illustrates the point. What has emerged is not a durable settlement but a fragile pause, already strained by continued Israeli strikes on Lebanon, disputed terms over the Strait of Hormuz (and now a U.S. naval blockade), and Iranian accusations of violations. The ceasefire is less a return to order than a snapshot of its absence: ad hoc, conditional, and dependent on a mediator whose security relationship with both Washington and Tehran is itself constrained.What is emerging is not simply more escalation, but a different kind of conflict: direct, sustained confrontation without clear evidence that overwhelming force can deliver decisive political outcomes. The scale of the current campaign makes this plain. U.S. and Israeli operations have targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile networks, and command systems at a tempo comparable to the opening phase of the 2003 Iraq War. By mid-March, U.S. and Israeli forces had conducted over 15,000 strikes across 26 of Iran’s 31 provinces with the U.S. military buildup described as the largest in the Middle East since 2003. Early reporting and official summaries confirm a broad campaign targeting Iranian leadership, nuclear sites, and missile forces across the country. Yet weeks into the conflict, Iran retains a meaningful portion of its missile arsenal and continues to strike across the region. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that roughly a third of Iran’s missile arsenal has been confirmed destroyed, with another third likely damaged or buried in hardened underground sites. Separate analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Iran’s missile launches fell sharply after the opening days of the war, while the Israeli military claimed that around 70 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers had been disabled by day 16. However, U.S. intelligence assessments disclosed by the Wall Street Journal suggest a different picture: Although more than half of Iran’s estimated 470 launchers had been destroyed, damaged, or trapped underground, many were likely repairable or recoverable. Iran’s missile stockpile had been roughly halved, but Tehran still retained thousands of short- and medium-