编者按：本文是一个由 11 部分组成的系列文章中的第六篇，探讨美国应如何组织、领导经济手段并将其融入战略、国防实践及更广泛的国家安全生态系统。本专题系列由波托马克政策研究所和 War on the Rocks 共同呈献。之前的文章可在“其他账目下的战争”页面找到。
美国进行的下一次重大战争，可能早在打响第一枪之前就由供应链决定了。这一现实已经初具规模，因为对手正利用出口管制、制裁和供应链杠杆来塑造战场结果。
俄乌战争是这一趋势的典型：中国对运往乌克兰的无人机及零部件实施了严格的出口限制，直接削弱了其军事能力。作为回应，乌克兰开发了一种脱离中国供应链的无人机，尽管成本压力使其继续依赖中国组件。
这并非孤例。近年来，专门针对军事技术的制裁变得更加突出。美国及其盟友对中国的先进半导体芯片及其生产工具实施了出口管制。作为反击，中国限制了对与五角大楼合作公司的稀土销售——这使近三分之一的国防采购项目面临短缺风险。这些例子表明，经济已成为“战争的一个作战领域”。
美国的军事学说尚未跟上这一形势。将经济外交手段纳入作战计划，需要更高的技术水平来评估任务风险、制定新型缓解策略，以及私营部门与国防企业之间更深层次的合作。这些工作应由五角大楼内的一个专门实体负责——例如提议中的“经济战作战能力机构”——其任务是识别、协调和解决工业...的基本风险。
Editor’s note: This article is the sixth in an 11-part series examining how the United States should organize, lead, and integrate economic statecraft into strategy, defense practice, and the broader national security ecosystem. This special series is brought to you by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and War on the Rocks. Prior installments can be found at the War by Other Ledgers page.The next major war the United States fights could be decided by supply chains long before the first shot is fired. That reality is already taking shape, as adversaries use export controls, sanctions, and supply chain leverage to shape outcomes on the battlefield.The Russo-Ukrainian War typifies this development: China has enacted strict export restrictions on drones and drone parts bound for Ukraine, directly degrading its military capability. In response, Ukraine has developed a China-free drone, though cost pressures continue to drive reliance on Chinese components.This is not an isolated case. Sanctions that specifically target military technology have grown more prominent in recent years. The United States and its allies have imposed export controls on China for advanced semiconductor chips and the tools made to produce them. China, in turn, has restricted rare earth sales to firms working with the Pentagon — putting nearly a third of defense procurement programs at risk of shortages. These examples show that economics has become an “operational domain of warfare.”U.S. military doctrine has yet to catch up. Incorporating economic tools of statecraft into operational planning will require greater technological sophistication to assess mission risk, novel mitigation strategies, and deeper cooperation between the private sector and the defense enterprise. These efforts should be housed in a dedicated entity within the Pentagon — such as the proposed Economic Warfare Operations Capability — tasked with identifying, orchestrating, and addressing fundamental risks to the industrial base and supply chains, while coordinating the interagency cooperation those missions demand. There is a need to build greater trust between the private sector and the Pentagon and to teach defense leaders economic statecraft skills.Economic statecraft lives primarily in the private sector. While the U.S. government sets the rules governing economic coercion, corporations execute the actions — and they answer to shareholders, not combatant commanders. Operationalizing economic statecraft, therefore, requires the Pentagon to cultivate closer private sector relationships and structure incentives that allow companies to profit while advancing national security objectives.The Pentagon has already launched initiatives toward this end — the Economic Defense Unit, the Office of Strategic Capital, and the Defense Innovation Unit, among them. What is missing is an integrating body that aligns these efforts toward common objectives. That is precisely the role the Economic Warfare Operations
