东京——除了扰乱全球经济的关税、战争和通货膨胀外，美国的企业巨头们正在苦恼于一个新问题：下一个被“比亚迪化”（BYD-ed）的科技公司会是谁？这里指的是中国电动汽车巨头，它已经超越了埃隆·马斯克的特斯拉及其同行，成为全球第一。
认为这家深圳电动汽车公司只是个例的想法，自那以后已被“DeepSeek冲击”所消解。这一冲击扰乱了人工智能领域，此外还有一系列其他的创业成功案例，从地平线机器人到自动驾驶公司轻舟智航（Qcraft）。
但随着2026年的展开，当美国总统唐纳德·特朗普将贸易战置于投资提升美国技术水平之上时，尽管面临特朗普的关税和贸易限制，中国正不动声色地夺取全球市场份额。
得益于习近平在2015年启动的“中国制造2025”计划，这并非宣传辞令，而是经济现实。而这最新一波的“中国冲击”，即日益为人所知的“中国冲击2.0”，正成为各地公司董事会谈论的话题。
原因在于：11年后，习近平努力扩张中国在电动汽车、人工智能、电池、生物技术、可再生能源、机器人、半导体和其他未来技术领域版图的成果，正越来越多地出现在西方媒体的头条。
正如野村控股的经济学家罗伯·苏巴拉曼（Rob Subbaraman）所解释的，最初的“中国冲击”是指中国在2001年加入世界贸易组织后，出口激增引发的划时代动荡。随后的外商直接投资流入，帮助将中国的廉价劳动力转化为“世界工厂”。
美国企业界突然意识到，中国制造的消费品在西方已变得无处不在。到2017年特朗普1.0总统任期开始时，中国占美国商品进口总额的22%。苏巴拉曼解释说，虽然这种动态有助于平抑全球通胀，但它“掏空了其制造业，导致了大量失业”。
自那以后，“中国……”
TOKYO — On top of the tariffs, wars and inflation upending the global economy, US chieftains are grappling with a new question: which tech companies might get “BYD-ed” next? The reference here is to the Chinese electric-vehicle juggernaut that’s zoomed past Elon Musk’s Tesla and its peers to become No. 1 globally.
The idea that the Shenzhen EV company was an aberration has since been dispelled by the “DeepSeek shock,” which disrupted the artificial intelligence realm, and by a number of other startup successes, from Horizon Robotics to autonomous vehicle shop Qcraft.
But as 2026 unfolds, and US President Donald Trump prioritizes trade wars over investing in raising America’s tech game, China is not so quietly grabbing market share around the globe despite Trump’s tariffs and trade curbs.
And thanks to the “Made in China 2025” program Xi Jinping launched in 2015, this isn’t spin but economic reality. And this latest “China shock”, increasingly known as “China shock 2.0”, is becoming the talk of corporate boardrooms everywhere.
The reason: 11 years on, the fruits of Xi’s effort to expand China’s footprint in EVs, AI, batteries, biotechnology, renewable energy, robotics, semiconductors and other future technologies are making more and more headlines in the Western media.
As economist Rob Subbaraman at Nomura Holdings explains, the original “China shock” was the epochal disruptions caused by the surge in imports from China after its 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization. The subsequent surge in foreign direct investment inflows helped transform China’s cheap labor into the world’s factory floor.
Corporate America suddenly realized that China-made consumer goods were becoming ubiquitous in the West. By 2017, when the Trump 1.0 presidency began, China accounted for 22% of the US’s total goods imports. While this dynamic helped tame global inflation, Subbaraman explains, it “hollowed out its manufacturing industry, causing significant job losses.”
Since then, “China’s supply-oriented fiscal approach of upgrading its industrial capacity and its deepening struggle to revive local consumer demand have given rise to the second China shock,” Subbaraman explains.
This “China shock 2.0 refers to the overcapacity in China that has led to price wars and an erosion of profit margins. Rather than retreating, China’s highly competitive manufacturers have redirected sales from the deflationary environment at home to foreign markets.”
Much of the discussion about this latest wave of Chinese competitiveness has focused on how it’s altering economic dynamics inside Asia’s biggest economy. As competition at home intensifies, Xi’s Communist Party has been trying to clamp down on excessive price competition — what economists term “anti-involution.”
Because China is “not so focused on boosting consumption at home, they’re basically making way more stuff than they can sell in their own domestic market,” notes Brookings Institution economist Jon Czin. “So a lot of tha
